Red Sky Alliance monthly queries our backend databases, identifying all new data containing Motor Vessel (MV) and Motor Tanker (MT) in the subject line of malicious emails. Malicious actors use emails with Motor Vessel (MV) or Motor Tanker (MT) in the subject line as a lure to entice users in the maritime industry to open emails containing malicious attachments. Red Sky Alliance is providing this list of Motor Vessels in which we directly observed the vessel being impersonated, with associated malicious emails. The identified emails attempted to deliver malware or phishing links to compromise the vessels, parent companies, ports and the entire Transportation Supply Chain. Specific vessel names or key words in the transportation supply chain can be queried using our two services and tools. Full report available here.
Significant Vessel Keys Words:
Figure 1. Map displaying location of attacker domains
Figure 2. Map displaying location of victim domains
Figure 3. Distribution of attacker and target domains
Common Transportation Attack Chain Overview
Table 1: List of dates, subject lines, malware detections, and sender data seen in Red Sky Alliance’s malicious email collection from last 30 days. Information extrapolated from the Subject Line. Full table attached.
Analysis
Five prevalent subject lines seen in our recent query are as follows:
- MV NM SAKURA / DISCH AKITA / AGENT APPOINTMENT
- New Order LJ05-26-0015-1 from Thome Ship Management Pte Ltd for Vessel LUOJIASHAN
- T. MH HIGHLANDER / Discaharge 10kMT Sugar at Port of Yokohama
- BULK EUROPA-2 AGENCY APPOINTMENT // PDA REQUEST
- MV "Nicos Tomasos" /PDA request
There are several themes generally represented by the subject lines seen. Specifically, in this month’s query we see mostly port requests and orders. These emails are seen to utilize common terminology to establish credibility. This credibility can make for a solid lure. In terms of the sending emails themselves, we saw several shipping lines and vessel operators, a Malaysian oil and gas company, and IT services company, and a car dealership in India.
In addition to impersonating these companies and various types of communication, these emails are also seen to be impersonating specific vessels. Vessels potentially being impersonated by these emails are:
- Navios Sphera (pictured above), which is a bulk carrier currently en route to Nantong, China and is sailing under the flag of Panama.
- Enduro Trader (pictured below), which is a bulk carrier currently en route to Vancouver, Canada and is sailing under the flag of Panama.
- Mountpark, which is a general cargo ship currently en route to Oshima, Nagasaki, Japan and is sailing under the flag of United Kingdom.
- NM Sakura, which is a bulk carrier currently en route to Vancouver, Canada and is sailing under the flag of Marshall Islands.
As one might expect, fabricating a vessel name is not difficult, but using a real ship’s name does not take much effort and could result in an increase of credibility.
The most prevalent malware detections associated with these emails this month are as follows:
- Html.Iframe.udgq - NANO-Antivirus
- DownLoader.9376 – DrWeb
- EUR:Trojan.Script.Generic – Kaspersky
- W64/Aotera.BF!tr – Fortinet
- Muldrop.1170 - DrWeb
Detections in these emails tend to be representative of generic trojans intended for a variety of purposes like delivering malware payloads, performing remote execution, credential stealing, etc. This holds true with this group of detections. The Exploit.Html.Iframe detection is indicative of a malicious HTML page intended to direct users to exploit servers. The JS.DownLoader and JS.Muldrop detections are indicative of malicious JavaScript intended to execute in a browser or script host. The Multidrop detection in particular indicates the presence of a multi-stage threat whereby additional payloads are downloaded after execution.
Vessel Flag of Convenience – All shipping size vessels which fall under international law must fly a country flag where it is registered. The flag of convenience (FOC) is the system that allows the vessel owners to avoid burdensome international legal regulations. When the ships are involved in this system, they are not connected to the laws of the countries where they are registered. The top five (5) flag states with the largest number of registered vessels are: Panama, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Hong Kong and Singapore.[1]
Supply Chain Report
Supply Chain Spoofing: In 2023, our analyst began monitoring the transportation supply chain, as often these transportation companies are used to gain cyber access to valuable targets. Maritime shipping is just one portion of the entire commercial transportation supply chain. By querying our data with numerous important supply chain keywords, we can also extract some more general supply chain related malicious emails. The five most prevalent subject lines seen with a general supply chain focus are as follows:
- REQ For Payment Invoice : FER2026000230
- Purchase Order - Enerzolve PI-TP1026230 CBB237
- Revise Invoice to Euro Currency
- Purchase Order PO-KA2982/2026-02
- Proforma Invoice
Much like maritime related emails, we can see many themes emerge in the subject lines of these malicious emails. In the last month, we can see primarily purchase orders and invoice notifications. These emails can also contain impersonations of companies in many industries. In our most recent query, we saw a large number of shipping and logistics companies, an elementary school in Taiwan, a high school in Indonesia, a foam manufacturer in Qatar, and a chemicals manufacturer in Switzerland.
The five most prevalent detections associated with these emails are as follows:
- unknown.zmutzy – CTX
- HEUR:Trojan.Script.Generic – Kaspersky
- Gen:Mail.Nophy.2 – ALYac
- JS/Agent.UTP trojan - ESET-NOD32
- Susp.AI.01.SuspSender - Arcabit
Unlike maritime specific emails, detections attached to emails targeting a wider supply chain tend to leverage phishing activities, which we can see with Gen:Mail.Nophy as those are generally associated with phishing emails. The eml.unknown detection is a generic classification of an email that is malicious, and the Mail.Susp.AI.01.SuspSender detection is indicative of a suspicious email sender, meaning that the domain, headers, or email structure was suspicious.
Table 2: List of dates, subject lines, malware detections, and sender data seen in Red Sky Alliance’s malicious email collection from last 30 days. Information extrapolated from the Subject Line. Full table attached.
Closing: These analytical results illustrate how a recipient could be fooled into opening an infected email and what sorts of dangers can accompany these emails. It is common for attackers to specifically target pieces of a company’s supply chain to build up cyber-attacks targeting larger companies. Doing so could cause the recipient to become an infected member of the maritime supply chain and thus possibly infect victim vessels, port facilities and/or shore companies in the marine, agricultural, and other industry sectors with additional malware. With approximately 90% of products being shipped in the maritime related supply chain, this is a serious cyber matter.
Fraudulent emails designed to make recipients hand over sensitive information, extort money, or trigger malware installation on shore-based or vessel IT networks remains one of the biggest day-to-day cyber threats facing the maritime industry and associated transportation supply line. These threats often carry financial liability to one or all those involved in the Transportation Supply Chain. Preventative cyber protection offers a strong first-line defense by preventing deceptive messages from ever reaching staff inboxes, but malicious hackers are daily developing new techniques to evade current detection. This supports our recommendation of daily cyber diligence.
The more convincing an email appears, the greater the chance employees will fall victim to a scam. To address this residual risk, software-based protection should be treated as one constituent of a wider strategy that also encompasses the human element as well as organizational workflows and procedures.
It is important to:
- Train all levels of the marine supply chain to realize they are under constant cyber-attack.
- Emphasize maintaining constant attention to real-world cyber consequences of careless cyber practices or general inattentiveness.
- Provide practical guidance on how to identify a potential phishing attempt.
- Use direct communication to verify emails and supply chain email communication.
About Red Sky Alliance
Red Sky Alliance strongly recommends ongoing monitoring from both internal and external perspectives. Internal monitoring is common practice. However, external threats are often overlooked and can represent an early warning of impending cyber-attacks. Red Sky Alliance can provide both internal monitoring in tandem with RedXray notifications on external threats to include botnet activity, public data breaches, phishing, fraud, and general targeting. All emails connected to the Transportation Supply Chain, to include Vessels, should be viewed with scrutiny.
Red Sky Alliance is in Steamboat Springs, CO USA. We are a Cyber Threat Analysis and Intelligence Service organization. We have been tracking vessel impersonation for over 6 years (and maintain historical reports). For questions, comments or assistance, please contact our lab directly at 1-844-492-7225, or feedback@wapacklabs.com
- Reporting: https://www.redskyalliance.org/
- Website: https://www.wapacklabs.com/
- LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/64265941
Weekly Cyber Intelligence Briefings:
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[*]: Vessel images obtained from VesselFinder
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